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INSURANCE
I. ACCIDENTAL INJURY
The question of determining whether or not accidental bodily
injury resulted directly and independently of all other causes was
interpreted by the South Carolina Supreme Court in the recent
case of Stevenson v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.' In
Stevenson, the insured developed peripheral neuropathy, a loss
of feeling in his legs brought about by his diabetic condition.
While walking on the deck of his boat heated by the summer sun,
the insured received third degree bums on his feet. As a result of
the burns, the insured's condition worsened and a trauma-
induced infection resulted in the amputation of his left leg below
the knee.2 The insurer appealed from a jury verdict for the plain-
tiff.,
The accident insurance policy provided for payment to the
insured if he "'received an accidental bodily injury. . . , and as
a result of the injury or exposure, directly and independently of
all other causes, has suffered any of the following losses. . . .' "
The appellant contended that the plaintiff's loss was not caused
by the injury alone, but rather was caused by his diabetic condi-
tion and arteriosclerosis which substantially contributed to the
need for amputation. 5 Moreover, appellant argued, the injury it-
self was not accidental in that the respondent should have reason-
ably foreseen "injury to his extremities in view of his known lack
of feeling therein."6 Citing further support, appellant maintained
that the insured's knowledge of his pre-existing disease should
1. 265 S.C. 348, 218 S.E.2d 427 (1975).
2. Id. at 351, 218 S.E.2d at 428.
3. This case was tried twice. In the first trial the jury returned a verdict for the
insurer, whereby the judge granted a new trial to the respondent. Brief for Appellant at
5.
4. 265 S.C. at 349-50, 218 S.E.2d at 428 (emphasis added). The policy provided for
compensation of the loss of a limb by amputation. Id.
5. Brief for Appellant at 6.
6. Id. at 7. Appellant cited Gulledge v. Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 472,
179 S.E.2d 605 (1971) as support for the proposition that injuries are not accidental if they
are the probable result of an action and are reasonably foreseeable by the insured or by a
reasonably prudent person in the same position. Id. at 476, 179 S.E.2d at 606. Appellant
reasoned that since the insured knew he had no feeling in his lower extremities, potential
injury was reasonably forseeable. Brief for Appellant at 7. The supreme court distin-
guished Gulledge on the grounds that it was an assault case, where there was question as
to whether the insured had provoked the assault. 265 S.C. 351, 218 S.E.2d at 429.
352
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have prevented his voluntary action since it was forseeable that
it might be potentially injurious to him, even though it would not
be harmful to persons in good health.7 The court rejected
appellant's contention and reaffirmed earlier decisions8 defining
"accident" as it is thought to be understood by the common man
who contracts for accident insurance. The test, the court ex-
plained, was whether the injury "occurred with his intent or voli-
tion." If the respondent did not willfully or intentionally burn his
feet, the injury was accidental. 10
7. Brief for Appellant at 7. Appellant cited Young v. Continental Casualty Co., 128
S.C. 168, 171, 122 S.E. 577, 578 (1924):
[I]f a person suffering from some weakness or disease should subject himself
to conditions which would not injuriously affect persons in ordinary health, but
should be dangerous to him, and injury results, it would not be due to an
accidental cause.
While no mention was made of the Young case in the Stevenson opinion, it would seem
to provide support to the appellant's argument. Respondent in fact subjected himself to
conditions that a person with normal sensation would not have been able to endure. Had
the insured felt the extreme heat which caused the bums, he would not have remained
on the surface and therefore would not have sustained the injury. Brief for Appellant at
7.
There is support, however, for respondent's contention that he exercised caution in
protecting himself from potential injury and that he did not reasonably foresee injury from
being barefooted in the boat. Brief for Respondent at 4. The wife of the insured testified
on cross-examination:
Q. You were aware of the loss of feeling in his feet?
A. So much so that never in the last years has Harry gone without his shoes
or gone swimming because we were afraid that he would step on a stone or
something so he just didn't go swimming. We always talked about when we got
our own boat, he would be able to get out on the boat and we would know that
there would be no stones there or swim from the boat and, of course this is the
first time he stepped on the boat.
Record at 23.
Mr. Stevenson similarly commented upon his lack of knowledge of the potential heat of
the boat deck:
Q. Had anybody warned you or given you any indication whatsoever that the
deck of the boat would get so hot as to cause bums?
A. No, when I bought the boat it was with the idea that it would be a sport
boat for fishing or swimming or waterskiing and I know with that thought in
mind that people with bare feet would be aboard the boat.
Record at 13.
8. Ducker v. Central Surety and Ins. Corp., 234 S.C. 228, 107 S.E. 342 (1959), Gaethe
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 199, 190 S.E. 451 (1937).
9. 265 S.C. 353-54, 218 S.E.2d at 430.
10. Justices Littlejohn and Ness in a brief concurring opinion felt the court placed
entirely too much emphasis upon the question of the accidental injury. Id. at 356, 218
S.E.2d at 431 (Littlejohn and Ness, JJ. concurring). This is justifiable commentary con-
sidering most courts' reluctance to construe familiar terms against the interests of the
insured.
2
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The insurer's primary justification for denying liability was
based upon the argument that the amputation of respondent's
foot was not the result of the accidental injury directly and inde-
pendently of all other causes." A common clause in most accident
insurance policies, the statement seeks to exclude from liability
all injuries which may have been, in part, the result of a pre-
existing disease or infirmity.' 2 Because courts have had consider-
able difficulty interpreting the clause, commentators have re-
marked upon the disparate coverage provided policy holders. 13
In Stevenson, there was evidence to support appellant's con-
tention that the insured's diabetic condition contributed to his
failure to respond to conservative medical treatment and thus
contributed to the condition which ultimately required amputa-
tion.'4 The court, however, chose to apply a proximate cause test 5
and thus affirmed the lower court verdict. In distinguishing
Gamble v. Travelers Ins. Co." as not applicable in Stevenson
because that policy contained a specific exclusionary clause, 17 the
11. Brief for Appellant at 11.
12. W. VANCE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE 976 (3d ed. B. Anderson 1951).
13. Bronson & Fields, The Problem of Concurrent Causation of Death Under Health
and Accident Policies: A Solution Found?, 32 INs. COUNSEL J. 241 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Bronson & Fields]. The authors suggest three basic approaches when considering pre-
existing illness as a concurring cause of injury or death. Courts may construe the policy
strictly, finding that "death would not have occurred but for the pre-existing disease" and
therefore deny recovery. Id. Conversely it may determine that but for the accident, death
would not have occurred, allowing recovery. However, the solution offered by the authors
is a determination of the proximate cause of the injury, allowing recovery when "the
accicent was the dominant cause . "Id. at 243. See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d
176 (1962).
14. The orthopedic surgeon who performed the amputation testified that it was "most
probable that the pre-existing conditions [the insured's diabetes, and arteriosclerosis]
contributed to the necessity for the amputation." Record at 61. While admitting that the
infection resulting from the burns did not heal properly because of the insured's diabetes
and arteriosclerosis, id. at 45-46, Respondent's medical expert denied that the pre-existing
condition caused the infection itself. Id. at 41.
15. The court cited Lesley v. American Sec. Ins. Co. as correctly quoting the law of
proximate cause:
"[Iun determining the cause of a loss for the purpose of fixing insurance liability
when concurring causes of damages appear, the proximate cause to which the
loss is to be attributed is or may be the dominant or efficient cause - the one
that sets the others in motion - although other and incidental causes may be
nearer in time to the result and may operate more immediately in producing
the loss."
261 S.C. 178, 184, 199 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1973). For a general discussion of proximate cause
see Simon, Proximate Cause in Insurance, 10 AMsa. Bus. L.J. 33 (1972).
16. 251 S.C. 98, 160 S.E.2d 523 (1968).
17. Gamble involved an insurance policy which contained an exclusionary clause
specifically disclaiming liability for injuries caused or contributed to by disease or bodily
3
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supreme court may have provided South Carolina litigants with
a potential guideline in cases where bodily disease or infirmity is
a concurring cause of the loss.
Previously the South Carolina court had held that the in-
sured need not be in perfect health prior to the accident to re-
cover,"5 and commentators have noted that most courts are hesi-
tant to strictly interpret policy provisions denying coverage.19
Many jurisdictions have allowed recovery even though bodily
disease and infirmity substantially contributed to the loss,2" al-
infirmity. Allowing recovery to the insured because the defendant failed to sustain the
burden of showing that the deceased's epilepsy caused or contributed to his death, the
court commented upon factors requiring denial of recovery when disease concurs with an
accident to cause loss:
If the insured is inflicted with a disease or infirmity at the time an alleged
accident occurs, which disease or infirmity causes or contributes to the death
or injury resulting, such death or injury is not within the coverage of a policy
which insures against death or bodily injury by accidental means, indepen-
dently of all other causes or which excepts death or bodily injury caused or
contributed to by a disease or infirmity.
251 S.C. at 103, 160 S.E.2d at 525 (emphasis added). Although the language could argua-
bly be interpreted to deny recovery whether one or both clauses are present in the contract,
the Stevenson court placed greater emphasis upon the presence of the secondary clause,
finding the additional exclusion controlling. 265 S.C. at 354, 218 S.E.2d at 430.
18. Richardson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 47, 115 S.E.2d 500 (1960). In
Richardson, the court applied a "but for the acccident" test and determined that the
insured's recovery from a leg fracture would have been uneventful but for the accident. It
should be noted that no specific exclusionary clause was present in the policy. Id. at 51,
115 S.E.2d at 503. See also Kilgore v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 231 S.C. 111, 97 S.E.2d 392
(1957), where an accidental injury activated a latent arthritic condition, thereby causing
disability. The court noted:
The courts have been particularly quick to permit recovery where the diseased
condition was a latent one, which might never have caused loss without the
occurrence of the accident.
Id. at 116, 97 S.E.2d at 394.
19. See Bronson & Fields, supra note 13, at 242. The authors maintain that courts
doubt that the insured intended that any condition he might later have that
contributed with accidental means to cause his death would bar benefits to
which his beneficiaries might otherwise be entitled.
Id.
20. See Mutual Benefit Health and Acc. Ass'n v. Ratliff, 440 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969), where the court allowed recovery although the insured developed ulcers as a
consequence of an accident breaking both bones of a leg. The resulting hemorrage of the
ulcers caused the insured's death. The court determined that sufficient evidence was
present to support a finding that the death resulted directly and independently of all other
causes. See also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Smith, 249 Miss. 873, 164 So.2d
462 (1964), where the court found that an automobile accident was the direct and indepen-
dent cause of death, although an autopsy confirmed that the insured died several days
later from a ruptured aortic aneurysm. The court explained:
[I]f death or disability results from the accident, the fact that but for weakness
or infirmities produced by former illness or disease it might not have been fatal
4
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though recovery may be denied where exclusionary clauses specif-
ically outline the boundaries of liability.2 Liability may be re-
lieved where, although an accident commenced the chain of
events, the extenuating complications are too far removed from
the initial event to justify recovery.22 Nevertheless, on the whole
the courts have been cognizant of the implications of interpreting
insurance policies too literally, since in doing so, they may well
exempt from liability all but the most simultaneous of accidental
injuries and deaths.23 Similarly, the courts have been hesitant to
exclude from recovery accidental injuries complicated by the nor-
mal aging process unless the contract specifically outlines the
limits of liability.
24
or as severe will not prevent recovery.
Id. at 888, 164 So. 2d at 469 (citation omitted. A Georgia court in Hall v. Gen. Acc. Assur.
Corp., 16 Ga. App. 66, 85 S.E. 600 (1915) applied a "but for the injury" test and deter-
mined that if the insured would not have died at the time that he did, but for the injury,
the accident was the direct cause. "[L]iability is not defeated merely because the existing
disease aggravated or rendered more serious the consequences of the accident." Id. at 74,
85 S.E. at 603-04.
McCray v. Nat'l. Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 244 So. 2d 342 (La. App. 1971) involved a
diabetic who, like the plaintiff in Stevenson, suffered an amputation of his leg because of
burns which led to infection. While allowing recovery, the court, citing Carnelious v.
Louisiana Indus. Life Ins. Co., 18 La. App. 739, 138 So. 533 (1931), observed that
[t]he fact that the physical infirmity of the victim may be a necessary condi-
tion to the result does not deprive the injury of its distinction as the sole produc-
ing cause.
In such case, disease and low vitality do not rise to the dignity of concurring
causes, but, in having deprived nature of her normal power of resistance to
attack, appear rather as the passive allies of the agencies set in motion by the
injury.
244 So. 2d at 345 (emphasis added); cf. Romanoff v. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Acc.
Ass'n of Amer., 243 App. Div. 725, 277 N.YQ.S. 291 (1935). In Romanof, another case
factually similar to Stevenson, the New York court decided that the insured's pre-exiting
diabetes and arteriosclerosis directly aggravated the accidental burns thereby necessitat-
ing and causing amputation. This previous condition therefore relieved the insurer's liabil-
ity. It should be noted that most of the cases allowing recovery did not include an exclu-
sionary clause specifically disclaiming liability for injuries contributed to by disease.
21. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 118 Ga. App. 587, 164 S.E.2d 859
(1968); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Braswell, 101 Ga. App. 133, 112 S.E.2d 804 (1960); Gamble
v. Traveler's Ins. Co., notes 16 & 17 supra.
22. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Asbell, 163 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 837 (1947); Horn v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 264 N.C. 157, 143 S.E.2d 70 (1965);
Roeper v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 138 Pa. Super. 283, 11 A.2d 184 (1940); Able v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 101, 149 S.E.2d 262 (1966).
23. See Wells v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 3 Mich. App. 220, 142 N.W.2d 57
(1966). The court maintained that unless the injury is instantaneous and final, most
injuries are the result of contributing physical factors.
24. See Hartford Acc. and Idemnity Co. v. Grant, 113 Ga. App. 795, 797, 149 S.E.2d
712, 714 (1966). While commenting that the parties to an insurance policy may agree to
5
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By allowing recovery where a pre-existing disease aggravated
the injury and contributed to the loss insured against, the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Stevenson seems to be suggesting to
the insurer that liability will be imposed unless it specifically
enumerates the risks excepted. The clause, "directly and inde-
pendently of all other causes," will exclude only those injuries so
complicated by pre-existing infirmities that one may not reason-
ably conclude that the accident was the dominant cause of the
diability. In the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo, "[a] policy of
insurance is not accepted with the thought that its coverage is to
be restricted to an Appollo or a Hercules. '2 5 If the insurer intends
to limit its liability in these situations successfully, it would ap-
pear to be necessary to provide an additional exclusionary clause
to eliminate any ambiguity in the policy.
II. INSURER'S LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEY FEES
In Coker v. Pilot Life Ins. Co.2 1 the supreme court clarified a
procedural question raised by the insurer regarding section 37-
167.1 of the South Carolina Code of Laws. This section requires
the insurer to assume liability for attorney fees where bad faith
or unreasonable refusal to pay a claim forces prosecution by the
insured to secure payment.Y In Coker, the respondent presented
exclude any risk, the court ruled that unless the insurer
clearly points out the risks not assumed, it seems only logical that it accepts
the risks of infirmity which are generally considered normal to mankind at the
various stages of life, and therefore, that osteoarthritis . . . cannot be consid-
ered as a concurring cause of disability ...
25. Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 84, 171 N.E. 914, 915
(1930).
26. 265 S.C. 260, 217 S.E.2d 784 (1975).
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-167.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
(1) In the event of a claim, loss or damage which is covered by a policy of
insurance or a contract of a nonprofit hospital service plan or a medical service
corporation and the refusal of the insurer, plan or corporation to pay such claim
within ninety days after a demand has been made by the holder of the policy or
contract and a finding on suit of such contract made by the trial judge of a
county court or court of common pleas that such refusal was without reasonable
cause or in bad faith, the insurer, plan or corporation shall be liable to pay such
holder, in addition to any sum or any amount otherwise recoverable, all reasona-
ble attorneys' fees for the prosecution of the case against the insurer, plan or
corporation. The amount of such reasonable attorneys' fees shall be determined
by the trial judge and the amount added to the judgment. In no event shall the
amount of the attorneys' fees exceed one third of the amount of the judgment
or the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars, whichever is less.
(2) If attorneys' fees are allowed as herein provided and, on appeal to the
Supreme Court by the defendant, the judgment is affirmed, the Supreme Court
6
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a motion requesting attorney fees under section 37-167.1 to the
lower court judge several days following sine die adjournment of
the initial trial which found the respondent entitled to payment.
The appellant contended that following adjournment, the lower
court judge no longer retained jurisdiction over the matter2 and
was therefore not empowered to order payment of attorney fees.
Moreover, appellant maintained, the order effected a retroactive
application of the statute since the failure to pay commenced
before the statute was enacted.29 Explaining that the statute con-
templates a determination of liability after the initial proceeding
is decided in favor of the insured,31 the supreme court would not
lend credence to the argument that the lower court judge no
longer had jurisdiction.'
Upholding the lower court order granting attorney fees to the
insured, 32 the South Carolina Supreme Court, through Justice
Bussey, disclosed its interpretation of the procedural require-
ments of the statute. The "preferable, though not exclusive,
method for raising the issue"3 3 of the insurer's liability for attor-
ney fees "would be for the insured to draw the issue to the atten-
tion of the trial judge . . . prior to the commencement of the
trial."34 The court recognized, however, that the question of bad
shall allow to the respondent such additional sum as the court shall adjudge
reasonable as attorneys' fees of the respondent on such appeal.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter or affect the Tyger
River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 161 S.E. 491, 163 S.C. 229, doctrine.
28. Brief for Appellant at 6-10.
29. Id. at 17-19. The supreme court rejected this argument on the basis that appel-
lant's refusal to pay continued after the statute's enactment. 264 S.C. at 267, 217 S.E.2d
at 788.
30. 265 S.C. at 266, 217 S.E.2d at 787. The supreme court noted that section 37-167.1
provided for attorney fees to be added to the judgment and therefore implied a post-trial
determination of liability.
31. The supreme court not only affirmed the lower court order but also made use of
section 37-167.1(2) and allowed reasonable attorney fees to the insured because of the
insurer's appeal. 264 S.C. at 269, 217 S.E.2d at 789. The supreme court similarly applied
this part of the statute to the insured in Blackburn v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
264 S.C. 535, 216 S.E.2d 192 (1975).
32. 265 S.C. at 269, 217 S.E.2d at 789. The court was of the view that the trial judge
was in fact the only judge who could entertain respondent's motion since he alone was
present during the initial proceding. Similarly, the court noted that liability for attorney
fees was not an issue in the first trial and therefore was not "finally determined prior to
the sine die adjournment. . . ." Id. at 266, 217 S.E.2d at 787.
33. Id. at 267, 217 S.E.2d at 788 (emphasis added).
34. Id. The court observed that this would allow the judge to consider relevant evi-
dence during the trial and, following a judgment for the insured, the judge could hear
further evidence to determine the insurer's liability. Appellant maintained that the issue
7
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faith or unreasonable refusal to pay a claim may not become
evident until the end of the trial and thus refrained from making
the suggested procedure mandatory."
HI. SOUTH CAROLINA RETALIATORY STATUTE
In State v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co.31 the
supreme court again considered the South Carolina retaliatory
statute31 which had previously remained unquestioned prior to
litigation beginning in 1972.31 Similar statutes have been enacted
by many states for the purpose of protecting domestic insurance
companies doing business in a foreign state, the purpose being to
should be raised in the complaint and that only evidence presented at the trial should be
considered in determining the insurer's liability. Brief for Appellant at 12-17. The supreme
court suggested, however, that this procedure could in fact be highly prejudicial to the
insured. 264 S.C. at 266-67, 217 S.E.2d at 787-88.
35. Whether abuse of the relatively flexible procedure outlined in Coker could lead
to an imposition of a stricter standard for allowing delayed motions on a request for
attorney fees under section 37-167.1 will have to be determined by future cases.
36. 265 S.C. 402, 219 S.E.2d 80 (1975). Appellants-respondents, Southern Farm Bu-
reau Life Insurance Co. (hereinafter referred to as "Life") and Southern Farm Bureau Cas.
Insurance Co. (hereinafter referred to as "Casualty"), consented to be tried together and
similarly appealed together.
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-132 (Cum. Supp. 1975). provides:
Whenever the laws of any other state of the United States shall require of
insurance companies chartered by this State and having agencies in such other
state, or of the agents thereof, any deposit of securities in such state for the
protection of policyholders or otherwise or any payment of penalties, certificates
of authority, license fees or otherwise, greater than the amount required for such
purposes from similar companies of other states by the then existing laws of this
State, all such similar companies of such states establishing or having thereto-
fore established an agency or agencies in this State shall make the same deposit
for a like purpose with the Commissioner and pay to the Commissioner, for
penalties, certificates of authority, license fees, filing fees or any other fees, an
amount equal to the amount of such charges imposed by the laws of such state
upon companies of this state and the agencies thereof.
Whenever the laws of any other state of the United States or the regulation
or action of any public official of such other state shall subject insurance compa-
nies chartered by this State to any restrictions, obligations, conditions or penal-
ties for the privilege of doing business in such other state which are greater than
those required of similar insurers organized or domiciled in such other state by
or in this State for the privilege of doing business herein, then all similar insurers
organized or domiciled in such other state shall be subjected to such greater
requirements imposed by or in such other state upon similar insurers of this
State. Provided, however, that all license fees and charges made pursuant to this
section shall be reduced to the extent of investment credits granted by §§ 37-
123 and 37-125.
(Emphasis in original).
38. The first case, Lindsay v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 258 S.C. 272, 188
S.E.2d 374 (1972) also involved Defendant Casualty.
8
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create a "substantial equality of burdens upon foreign and do-
mestic corporations. '"'
In Southern Farm Bureau the State claimed defendants Life
and Casualty owed additional retalitory fees because they impro-
perly deducted investment credits under sections 37-123,10 and
37-125.1 Although two Attorney General opinions42 had inter-
39. 19 J. APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 10352, at 59 (1946) [hereinafter
cited as APPLEMAN]. See also Employers Cas. Co. v. Hobbs, 152 Kan. 815, 107 P.2d 715
(1941); Life and Cas. Co. v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 350, 25 S.W.2d 748 (1930); Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 295 A.2d 853 (Pa. Commn. 1972); Lindsay v. Southern Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 258 S.C. 272, 188 S.E.2d 374 (1972). The statute calls for a compari-
son of the laws of the domicile state of the foreign insurer to determine whether the burden
upon a South Carolina insurer doing business in the foreign state is greater than the
burden on a foreign insurer in South Carolina. If the burden is greater, the retaliatory
statute allows an increase in the amount owed by the foreign insurer to equal that owed
by the South Carolina insurer.
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-123 (1962) provides:
If the executive officer making a return for a company required to pay the
additional fee provided by § 37-122 shall file with the Commissioner a sworn
statement showing that at least one fourth of the reserve on all policies issued
in this State is invested in any or all of the following securities or property- to
wit, (a) notes or bonds of this State or of securities and municipalities of this
State or subdivisions thereof, (b) first mortgage bonds of real estate in this State
or first mortgage bonds of solvent domestic or domesticated corporations whose
improved property is situate entirely within this State and which are owned and
controlled independently of foreign corporations and operated entirely within
the State; (c) average daily balance on deposits in banks of this State main-
tained continuously for twelve months next preceding the date of the return or
(d) any property situate within the State and returned for taxes therein, at the
value at which it is returned, then the additional license fees on premiums
collected during the time such investments have been actually made and main-
tained shall be one and three fourths per cent under like conditions if such
investment be one half of such reserve, the additional license fee shall be one
and one half per cent. Under like conditions if such investment be three fourths
of such reserve, the additional license fee shall be one and one fourth per cent.
And if the entire reserve be so invested, under like conditions, the additional
license fee on such premium receipts shall be one per cent.
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-125 (1962) provides:
If the executive officer making a return for a company required to pay the
additional fee provided by § 37-124 shall file with the Commissioner a sworn
statement showing that at least one fourth of the premium receipts on all risks
in this State is invested in the securities named in § 32-123, then the additional
license fee on premiums collected during the time such investments have been
actually made and maintained shall be one and three fourths per cent. Under
like conditions if such investments be one half of such premium receipts, the
additional license fee shall be one and one half per cent. Under like conditions
if the investments shall be three fourths of such premium receipts, the addi-
tional license fee shall be one and one fourth per cent. And if the entire premium
receipts be so invested, under like conditions, the additional license fee on such
premium receipts shall be one per cent.
42. 1964-65 Op. ATTY. GEN. 163; 1965-66 Op. AmTY. GEN. 116.
9
VanDoren: Insurance
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
INSURANCE
preted the interrelation between sections 37-123 and 37-125 with
section 37-132 as allowing credit for local investments despite the
fact that a foreign state would not provide a similar deduction for
South Carolina companies, a 1969 opinion reconsidered the issue
and determined that the retaliatory statute compelled
disallowance of the credit.43 In 1971, the South Carolina Insurance
Department sought a declaratory judgment against defendant
Casualty to determine whether investment credits were properly
deductible." In Lindsay v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Co.4" the
South Carolina Supreme Court, agreeing with the 1969 Attorney
General opinion, determined that the retaliatory statute applied
and therefore that no deduction should be allowed.46 On June 1,
1972 the plaintiff in the present action made demand upon defen-
dant Casualty for retaliatory fees and taxes for the years 1963
through 1971 and upon defendant Life Company for the years
1965 through 1971.11 On July 14, 1972 an amendment to section
37-132 was signed into law, which the legislature intended to be
retroactively applied.48 On February 5, 1973 plaintiff made formal
demand upon defendants Life and Casualty and the present ac-
tion commenced 15 days later.49 Prior to the Southern Farm
Bureau decision, but after the commencement of the action, the
South Carolina Supreme Court held in Lindsay v. National Old
Line Ins. Co."0 that the 1972 Amendment was not retroactive.
51
The State also made claims against defendants Life and Casualty
for retaliation against income taxes imposed upon foreign insur-
ers doing business in Mississippi.2 In Judge53 Ness's order, the
43. 1968-69 Op. ATTY. GEN. 269.
44. Record at 123. Mississippi, the domicile of the defendant, did not allow invest-
ment credits. Id. at 124.
45. 258 S.C. 272, 188 S.E.2d 374 (1972).
46. Id. at 281, 188 S.E.2d at 378.
47. Record at 124.
48. The amendment added what is now the last sentence to the section (see note 37
supra), and stated: "This enactment is declared to be declaratory of the existing provi-
sions of Section 7-132." No. 1555, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 3025.
49. Record at 124.
50. 262 S.C. 621, 207 S.E.2d 75 (1974). To avoid confusion, Lindsay v. National Old
Line Ins. Co. is referred to as National Old Line; Lindsay v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas.
Co., 258 S.C. 272, 188 S.E.2d 374 (1972) is referred to as Lindsay; and State Southern
Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co., 265 S.C. 402, 219 S.E.2d 80 (1975) is referred to as
Southern Farm Bureau.
51. The court stated that, in effect, the legislature was trying to overrule the Lindsay
case.
52. Record at 124.
53. Now supreme court Justice Ness.
1976]
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lower court declared that retaliatory fees disallowing the invest-
ment credit and additional charges based on Mississippi income
taxes were owed by both defendants. 54
Defendants raised several issues in defense. They first as-
serted that the 1972 amendment was retroactive in effect and, as
such, relieved them of liability for prior investment credits taken.
On appeal, however, defendants acknowledged National Old Line
to be dispositive of this issue.5 Defendants next argued that the
decision in Lindsay should not be given retroactive effect.5 6 The
supreme court found this argument "untenable"5 and explained
that the Lindsay decision was "the construction of a statute
which had been the law since its enactment in 1934 and was the
law until the July 14, 1972 amendment.""9
The defendants lastly claimed that the state was estopped
from collecting the retaliatory fees and taxes,59 asserting that they
had relied in good faith upon the 1965 and 1966 Attorney General
opinions declaring that investment credits were properly taken.
Similar reliance was placed upon the acceptance of the defen-
dants' annual returns by the South Carolina Insurance Depart-
ment, which made no claim that the defendants owed any addi-
tional taxes or fees.60 While acknowledging the accepted rule that
54. Record at 143. The amount due was limited by a 3-year statute of limitations
deemed applicable by the lower court. The State appealed this ruling, arguing that a 3-
year statute of limitations set forth in § 65-2707 was the applicable statute. Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent at 6. The State also argued that the defendants failed to
invoke the 3-year statute in their pleadings. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent at 8.
The supreme court reversed the lower court's ruling as to the statute of limitations, stating
that the issue of "applicability . . . was never presented to the court for a determina-
tion. . . ." 265 S.C. at 412, 219 S.E.2d at 85.
55. Brief of Defendants-Appellants-Respondents at 3-4.
56. Id. at 4. Defendants asserted as justification for this argument the speed with
which the General Assembly enacted the amendment to § 37-132, 3 months following the
Lindsay decision. While again acknowledging that the amendment was not retroactive in
fact, the defendants claimed that the attempt to make it retroactive was evidence of
legislative intent as to the statute's application. Id. at 5-6.
Defendants also argued that since the Lindsay case was a declaratory judgment, it
should be given prospective application only. Citing Power v. McNair, 255 S.C. 150, 177
S.E.2d 551 (1970) and Williams Furn. Corp. v. Southern Coating & Chem. Co., 216 S.C.
1, 56 S.E.2d 576 (1949) as support, defendants distinguished declaratory judgment actions
from "judgments in other actions, the former being to declare legal rights and relation-
ships prospectively and the latter to enforce legal rights and relationships." Brief for
Defendants-Appellants-Respondents at 11.
57. 265 S.C. at 409, 219 S.E.2d at 83.
58. Id.
59. Brief for Defendants-Appellants-Respondents at 13.
60. Record at 96-97. The defendants also offered as an exhibit a letter from the South
11
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Attorney General opinions are not binding on the court,6' the
defendants questioned the "value . . . such opinions may have
if they may not be relied upon at least to estop the state from
applying retroactively a subsequent judicial decision contrary to
the Attorney General's opinions."6" Submitting that "manifest
injustice" would lie if estoppel were not allowed, the defendants
requested that at least interest and penalties be eliminated from
the total amount due.
63
While originally the defense of estoppel was not available
against the State, 4 the rule has been modified to allow estoppel
in certain areas including contractual relations.6" However, it is
generally accepted that "estoppel will not be applied to deprive
the government of the due exercise of its police power, or to affect
public revenues or property rights, or to frustrate the purpose of
its laws or thwart its public policy." 6 Thus, misinterpretation of
the law of a State by its public officials will not justify the finding
of estoppel, particularly in tax cases.67 However, it would appear
difficult to justify the denial of estoppel in the present case by
citing the revenue aspect of the retaliatory statute, for it is gener-
ally accepted that these statutes are not primarily a revenue rais-
ing measure, such feature being purely incidental." The lower
Carolina Department of Insurance dated March 12, 1968 informing Defendant Life of an
error in its 1967 Fee and Tax Return. While impliedly acknowledging the propriety of
taking investment credits, the letter asserted that the defendant had taken a credit for
certain investments which did not qualify for deduction and requested remittance of an
additional amount. Id. at 345-46.
61. Kabler v. Redfearn, 215 S.C. 224, 54 S.E.2d 791 (1949).
62. Brief for Defendants-Appellants-Respondents at 17.
63. Id. at 18.
64. Baker v. State Highway Dept., 166 S.C. 481, 165 S.E. 197 (1932).
65. Heyward v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 240 S.C. 347, 126 S.E.2d 15 (1962).
66. Id. at 351, 126 S.E.2d at 17 (citations omitted); Powell v. Board of Comm'rs of
Police Ins. & Annuity Fund, 210 S.C. 136, 41 S.E.2d 780 (1947).
67. State v. Maddox Tractor & Equip. Co., 260 Ala. 136, 69 So. 2d 426 (1953); Berry
v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 150 Colo. 543, 375 P.2d 93 (1962); Superior Coal Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 4 Ill. 2d 459, 123 N.E.2d 713 (1954); Farrow v. City Council of
Charleston, 169 S.C. 373, 168 S.E.2d 852 (1933).
68. 19 APPLEMAN § 10352 at 59; Note, Retaliatory Taxation of Insurance Companies,
27 VA. L. REv. 686, 689 (1941); see Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 350,
353, 25 S.W.2d 748, 749 (1930); Republic Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 272 Minn. 325, 330, 138
N.W.2d 776, 779 (1965); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 295 A.2d 853, 855 (Pa.
Commw. 1972); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 161 Wash. 135, 138, 296 P. 813, 815
(1931). Because the retaliatory statute is aimed at equalizing the burdens of foreign and
domestic insurers, it has been said that the success of the statute "depend[s] on how little
is collected under its terms rather than how much." Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Common-
wealth, supra at 855.
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court nevertheless refused to find the defense of estoppel avail-
able to the defendants," and a majority" of the supreme court
affirmed."
The arguments then turned to the application of section 37-
132 against Mississippi income taxes imposed upon foreign insur-
ers doing business in that state.7 2 The defendants maintained
69. Record at 133. It should be noted with interest that the lower court strongly
emphasized the revenue aspect in reaching its decision, although there was minor refer-
ence to the police power jusitification. Id. at 129-33.
70. Justice Littlejohn wrote the opinion of the court, Justice Bussey offered the sole
dissent. In the previous retaliatory statute cases, Lindsay and National Old Line, Justice
Bussey was joined in dissent by former Justice Brailsford.
71. 265 S.C. at 409-10, 219 S.E.2d at 83. The court agreed with the State that the
defendants had not met the essential requirements for estoppel as outlined in Frady v.
Smith, 247 S.C. 353, 147 S.E.2d 412 (1966). Frady required the party asserting the defense
to prove three elements:
(1) Lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts
in question; (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (3) action
based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.
Id. at 359, 147 S.E.2d at 415. In explanation of its assertion, the State argued that the
defendants did not change their positions in reliance upon the Attorney General opinions.
Instead, they argued, defendants continued to take investment credits as they had before
the opinions were published, and following the 1969 opinion, the defendants continued to
deduct credits as they had in the past. Respondent Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant-
Respondent at 10. The defendants maintained that "[to argue . . . one must change
position in order to show reliance, when the Opinions relied upon confirm one's present
position, is patently absurd." Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants-Respondents at 3. In
response to the State's allegation that the defendants ignored the 1969 Attorney General
opinion, defendants argued that the opinion was being "contested in the courts" and to
change positions before final judicial determination would have been unreasonable. Id. at
4. The majority also agreed with the lower court judge that the doctrine of estoppel is not
available against the government in depriving application of its police or taxing power.
265 S.C. at 410, 219 S.E.2d at 83.
The dissent determined that the essential elements of estoppel had been met by the
defendants. Id. at 414, 219 N.E.2d at 85 (Bussey, J., dissenting). Justice Bussey addition-
ally declared that despite the general rule that estoppel is not applicable against the
enforcement of a government's police powers,
the instant case presents an excellent example of manifest injustice which
should at least call for this Court to seriously consider the application of the
doctrine of estoppel under the existing circumstances.
Id. at 414, 219 S.E.2d at 85 (Bussey, J., dissenting). Justice Bussey suggested that the
State should at a minimum be estopped from collecting the interest and penalties for late
payment.
72. Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-7-5 (1972) which provides in part:
(1) There is hereby assessed and levied, to be collected and paid as herein-
after provided, for the calendar year 1968 and fiscal years ending during the
calendar year 1968 and all taxable years thereafter, upon the entire net income
of every resident individual, corporation, association, trust or estate, in excess
of the credits provided, a tax at the following rates:
On the first five thousand dollars of taxable income, or any part thereof, at
the rate of three percent;
13
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that Mississippi income taxes were not a proper item to be con-
sidered when applying South Carolina's retaliatory statute,
7 3
since section 37-132 makes no reference to tax or taxes while
enumerating those charges which will trigger retaliation. 7 Argu-
ing that the retalitory statute was specifically enacted to retaliate
against penalties imposed upon domestic insurers for the
privilege of doing business in a foreign state, the defendants
maintained that the imposition of an income tax in Mississippi
was not directed at insurance companies alone and, as such, was
not a "charge" contemplated by the retaliatory statute.75
There is virtually unanimous support for the often stated rule
that retaliatory statutes are penal in nature and, as such, must
be strictly construed and may not be extended beyond the letter
of the law. 6 One court has maintained that even though strict
construction might leave the statute ineffective in certain as-
pects, a liberal construction cannot be justified.7  Nevertheless,
the state argued here that phrases such as "charges," "or other-
wise," and "or any other fees" in section 37-132 necessarily in-
cluded the income taxes imposed by Mississippi,78 explaining
that the legislature was aware it could not foresee at the time of
On all taxable income in excess of five thousand dollars, at the rate of four
percent.
(2) A like tax is hereby imposed to be assessed, collected and paid an-
nually, except as hereinafter provided, at the rate specified in this section and
as hereinafter provided, upon and with respect to the entire net income, from
all property owned or sold, and from every business, trade or occupation carried
on in this state by individuals, corporations, partnerships, trusts or estates, not
residents of the State of Mississippi.
73. Brief for Defendants-Appellants-Respondents at 21.
74. See note 37 supra.
75. Brief for Defendants-Appellants-Respondents at 25. The Mississippi statute im-
poses the tax upon "every business, trade or occupation carried on in this state by individ-
uals, corporations, partnerships, trusts or estates, not residents of the State of Missis-
sippi." See note 72 supra. It is difficult to construe this statute as imposing a special
burden upon insurers alone.
76. 19 APPLEMAN § 10352, at 59; W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE (3d
ed. B. Anderson 1951) 137; Note, Retaliatory Taxation of Insurance Companies, 27 VA.
L. REv. at 689, Banker's Life Co. v. Richardson, 192 Cal. 113, 218 P. 586 (1923); Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lowe, 354 Ill. 398, 188 N.E. 436 (1933); State v. American Ins. Co.,
79 Ind. App. 398, 137 N.E. 338 (1922); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 161 Wash. 135,
296 P. 813 (1931).
77. State v. American Ins. Co., 79 Ind. App. 398, 137 N.E. 338, 341 (1922). But see
Lindsay v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 258 S.C. 272, 188 S.E.2d 374 (1972)
which, after announcing the general rule, declared "the law should not be construed so as
to defeat its purpose." Id. at 277, 188 S.E.2d at 376.
78. Respondent Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent at 15.
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enactment all potential fees, taxes, and charges which would trig-
ger section 37-132. Therefore, the State maintained, the statute
was drafted to accommodate future charges imposed by foreign
states."
The defendants referred the supreme court to the established
rule requiring ambiguous tax statutes to be construed in favor of
the taxpayer" and additionally offered the common law rule of
ejusdem generis as support for a favorable construction.8' While
impressed with the ejusdem generis argument, the court deter-
mined that the legislature intended to equalize the burdens of
insurance companies and therefore affirmed the lower court's in-
clusion of the Mississippi income taxes."2 The dissent took issue
with the majority's disposition of the income tax aspect of the
case. Convinced that the rule of ejusdem generis required limita-
tion of the statute to charges enumerated, Justice Bussey main-
tained that the intent of the legislature was "to retaliate only as
to those obligations placed upon South Carolina insurers for the
privilege of conducting the business of insurance in a given
state." 3 Thus, the dissent determined, since legislative intent did
not require inclusion, the rule of strict construction controlled.
In deciding that the Mississippi income taxes are proper
items for retaliation, the lower court and the supreme court,
adopted an aggregate approach to the retaliatory statute.8 4 Exam-
ining the total burdens imposed upon a domestic insurer includ-
79. Id.
80. Brief for Defendants-Appellants-Respondents at 26-27.
81. Id. at 27. The South Carolina court specifically defined ejusdem generis in Vassey
v. Spake, 83 S.C. 566, 65 S.E. 825 (1909):
"Where a statute, or other document, enumerates several classes of persons, or
things, and immediately following, and classed with such enumeration, the
clause embraces "other" persons, or things, the word "other" will generally be
read as "other such like," so that persons, or things, therein comprised may be
read as ejusdem generis with, and not of a quality superior to or different from
those specifically enumerated."
Id. at 567, 65 S.E. at 826 (citation omitted). However, the court concluded with the
following qualification:
Whenever the intention is clear, and there is no room for construction, the rule
does not apply.
Id. See also State Ins. Comm'r v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 241 Md. 108, 215 A.2d 749
(1966).
82. 265 S.C. at 411, 219 S.E.2d at 84. Thus the court determined that the clear intent
of the legislature precluded application of the rules of statutory construction. See also
South Carolina Mental Health Comm'r v. May, 226 S.C. 108, 83 S.E.2d 713 (1954).
83. 265 S.C. at 415, 219 S.E.2d at 86 (Bussey, J., dissenting).
84. Record at 137-39.
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ing income taxes, and the legislative intent to equalize the bur-
dens of insurers, the lower court maintained that the exclusion of
the income taxes "would be blatently incompatible with the
unanimous declared purpose of retaliation by all five members of
our Supreme Court; that is, equalization of burdens."85 On ap-
peal, the defendants argued that had the legislature intended an
aggregate approach, an express provision could have been in-
cluded within the statute."8 Indeed, many statutes specifically
provide for the aggregate approach to retaliatory statutes, 7 al-
though it may be adopted as readily by judicial decision."
Commentators have discussed the problems involved with
the item-by-item approach when attempting to compare different
types of exactions and generally observe the aggregate approach
to be more satisfactory.89 One court explained that the retaliatory
statute should be employed when the total exactions imposed by
one state exceed the total exactions imposed by another state,
regardless of how any particular exaction is characterized. Cer-
tainly the intent of the legislature was to equalize the burdens
placed on insurers. Allowing the aggregate approach in determin-
ing the proper amount of retaliation would effectively accomplish
this purpose.
The South Carolina Retaliatory Statute has produced a vari-
ety of legal questions in recent years and perhaps now is settled
as to its application. However, even though the Southern Farm
Bureau decision has clearly announced to insurers the approach
the South Carolina Supreme Court will take regarding the stat-
ute, the recent decisions have placed insurers in the unfortunate
position of being held retroactively liable for amounts previously
declared not due. For this reason it appears manifestly unjust to
exact penalties and interest from the defendants during the pe-
riod when the application of the law was in question.
The manner in which the supreme court interpreted the stat-
ute in Southern Farm Bureau can be justified as a logical applica-
tion of the law. Although emphasis was placed upon the revenue
85. Id. at 139.
86. Brief for Defendants-Appellants-Respondents at 29.
87. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 56-321 (1970); OaE. REv. STAT. § 731-854 (1973); TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 21.46 (1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-87 (1970).
88. PELLETIER, Insurance Retaliatory Laws, 39 NOTRE DMm LAW. 243, 257 (1964).
89. Pelletier, supra note 88 at 254-57. Problems traditionally arise when an exaction
in one state has no comparable exaction in another state.
90. Employers' Cas. Co. v. Hobbs, 149 Kan. 774, 89 P.2d 923 (1939).
19761
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aspect of the statute, section 37-132 can be properly characterized
as an exercise of the state's police power, and as such, it is not
subject to the doctrine of estoppel. Similarly, a reasonable inter-
pretation of section 37-132, coupled with the certainty of legisla-
tive intent to equalize the burdens, justifies the inclusion of for-
eign income taxes as a proper item to be considered when assess-
ing retaliatory fees. The construction of the statute offered by the
supreme court is nevertheless somewhat strained, particularly
when considering the general rule requiring strict construction of
a penal statute. However, the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Lindsay declared that construction must not defeat the intent of
the statute, and the Southern Farm Bureau decision preserves
the legislative intent. There is considerable substance in the argu-
ment that Mississippi income taxes are not imposed upon foreign
insurers for the privilege of doing the business of insurance in that
state and thus should not be considered appropriate for retalia-
tion. The supreme court, however, has taken the position that the
aggregate burdens will be compared without an examination of
the character of a particular assessment and in doing so has ap-
parently joined a growing trend among jurisdictions with retalia-
tory statutes.
Elizabeth H. VanDoren
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